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Innovations in Psychotherapy: Tracking 
the Narrative Construction of Change1
This chapter presents a research program on narrative change 
processes that is under development at our research center. It 
developed from the study of narrative therapy, following White 
and Epston’s (1990) model of re-authoring narratives, in which 
the notion of “unique outcome” is central. Unique outcomes 
are defined as all the details that fall outside the domain of 
the dominant narrative, namely, episodes in which the person 
did, thought, imagined or felt something different, or related 
to others in a new way, from what the problematic narrative 
“prescribes” for his or her life (see also White, 2007).
We started studying how “unique outcomes” developed 
throughout the process of narrative therapy, and then wondered 
if developing these narrative details outside the main problematic 
story could be, in a sense, a common factor of all different kinds 
of psychotherapies, even if this is something that therapists 
outside the narrative tradition do not emphasize explicitly. If 
one assumes that all therapists wish to produce novelties in 
different forms (cognitive, affective, behavioral) it is not hard to 
1  This chapter was supported by the Portuguese Foundation for Science 
and Technology (FCT), by the Grant PTDC/PSI/72846/2006 (Narrative 
Processes in Psychotherapy). We are grateful to Gena Rodrigues for the 
revision of the English and to Carla Machado for the suggestions done on 
the first draft of this chapter.
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imagine that “unique outcomes” must emerge in every form of 
successful psychotherapy, independently of the means that are 
used to achieve them.
The target of this chapter is to provide an overall view of the 
studies on the role of these unique outcomes in psychotherapy 
change. We organized this chapter in four parts. We start by 
discussing the theoretical and methodological foundations of 
our research, highlighting its narrative frame. After presenting 
our current main findings, a heuristic model of change is 
presented. Working from this model, we reflect upon how 
change is prevented from occurring in poor-outcome cases. We 
then discuss the new paths of research that we are developing: 
namely intensive case-study research of these models of change 
and stability. This chapter ends with some provisional reflections 
about how this research can inform therapists, contributing in 
this way to the development of psychotherapy as a practice. 
Theoretical Assumptions
Bateson (1979) once suggested that if we were able to ask 
a computer if it would one day be able to think as a human 
being (and if the computer could in fact model the way humans 
think), the output would begin, after some difficult processing, 
“That reminds me a story” (p. 22). Congruent with this idea 
from Bateson, our first assumption is that human beings 
organize reality in a narratively structured way (Bruner, 1986; 
McAdams, 1993; Polkinghorne, 1988; Sarbin, 1986). Emotions, 
feelings, relations and behaviors acquire meaning through 
their integration in stories that are narrated to the self and/
or to others. In the uninterrupted flow of our life we create 
meaning out of events by “cutting” the flow of timely experience 
into discrete pieces and by constructing meaning by elaborating 
narrative themes (Kelly, 1955). We have here two interrelated 
processes: the event, that is something that happened, and the 
action of narrating it to a meaningful audience (the self, the 
therapist, meaningful others). This means, as Hermans (1996) 
said, that the self is simultaneously the content of the story and 
the act of telling it. Or, as suggested by Wortham (2001), the 
articulation between the narrative content and the act of telling 
is a powerful tool for self-construction. Moreover, narrative 
always has a dimension of enactment, since it is quite related with 
our action, as human agents, in the physical and social world. 
Narratives, in a way, are performative acts – not simply self-
contained performances – and, as such, they produce relational 
results to which, in return, we adapt to. Through the use of 
these symbolic means we are thrown into a constant dynamic of 
narrative positioning and repositioning (Hermans & Dimaggio, 
2004; Valsiner, 2002; Salgado & Gonçalves, 2007).
Congruently, therapists have been developing a diversity of 
techniques to allow the transformation of life-narratives, but it 
is our suggestion, inspired by the re-authoring therapy of White 
and Epston (1990), that at least part of this transformation 
occurs through the expansion of unique outcomes. New self-
stories are constructed from the narration of novelties, since 
these innovative stories create new paths of further development 
and free the person to engage in new forms of authorship. To 
tell new viable stories means to live new narratives. Indeed, as 
we argued previously, new forms of narrative are intermingled 
with new forms of relating with (and within) our world.
However, as our research has developed, so too has our 
terminology.  Instead of “unique outcomes,” we prefer to use the 
term “innovative moments” (or i-moments), for two main reasons. 
First, as we shall see, unique outcomes are not unique events; they 
occur frequently in psychotherapy, even in poor outcome cases. 
Of course, the idea of “unique” in White and Epston’s (1990) 
work does not refer literally to the frequency of the events, but 
to their exceptionality in relation to the problematic narrative. 
However, for the unfamiliar reader the idea of uniqueness 
may be misleading. Another problem has to do with the term 
“outcomes.” “Unique outcomes” are more than a result or an 
output, and as we will illustrate, they reflect a developmental 
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process. Hence, in this research we are truly concerned with the 
processes involved in narrative transformations and that is why 
we prefer the idea of innovative moments (or i-moments) over 
unique outcomes.
Before moving to a consideration of psychotherapy let us 
illustrate the concept of i-moment at a more elementary level, 
using for that purpose the developmental research of Fogel, 
Garvey, Hsu and West-Stroming (2006) on the relationship 
of mothers and babies in infancy. Fogel et al. study how a 
relationship develops by using the concept of frames, understood 
as “segments of co-action that have a coherent theme, that take 
place within a particular location (in space or in time), and 
that involve particular forms of mutual co-orientation between 
participants” (p. 3). These frames evolve in time, in particular 
forms of sequence of mutual action and response, creating a 
kind of lived narrative. By their turn, in our view, narratives 
themselves operate as basic guidelines of social coordination – 
in a sense, as frames. These frames can also be studied in their 
developmental dynamics, as it happens with narratives.
One typical frame in the first 6 months of life is the guided 
object frame, in which the caregiver and child play with objects. 
Let us imagine that in one situation the mother shows different 
objects to the child while the infant observes, but in another 
the mother attempts to put the toy in the infant’s hands or the 
infant tries to reach for the object. These last occurrences open 
the possibility for development to occur, given that it brings an 
innovation to the system. From here the child may start grabbing 
objects and playing with them, without the help of the mother, 
giving rise to a new frame, which Fogel et al. (2006) term non-
guided object frame.
We have in this simple example three types of change that 
are characterized by Fogel et al. (2006), namely:
•Level 1 change, which occurs when there is variability 
inside the same frame (e.g., mother shows different 
objects);
•Level 2 takes place when an innovation occurs (in our 
terminology, an i-moment), for instance when the infant 
for the first time reaches for the toy;
•Level 3, the final level, in which there is a clearly 
developmental change; for instance when the non-
guided frame emerges and stabilizes out of level 2 (we 
equate this in psychotherapy with the expansion of 
i-moments into a new narrative).
To Fogel et al. (2006) although level 1 change is always present 
given the dynamic nature of open systems, level 2 innovations 
can lead to more enduring changes, through developmental 
change (i.e. level 3): 
The successful innovations, the ones that get noticed, 
remain in the system, and ultimately provoke a level 3 
change, must somehow be perceived as “interesting”, or 
“better”, or “exciting”, or “worthwhile”. This implies 
that there is an inherent valuation of changes that is, 
an emotional aspect to the information of what makes a 
difference. (p. 238)
The reality of therapy is far more complex than that of the 
early interaction between caregivers and infant, however it is 
our suggestion that the same kinds of changes are also present 
in therapy. Whenever the client tells a redundant story – let 
us take as an example a story of pain for not being valued and 
loved as a child – we notice the same themes present over and 
over2. White and Epston (1990) call this redundancy a problem-
saturated story and Neimeyer (2000), in his conceptualization 
of narrative disruption, equated this with narrative dominance. 
Whatever the term used to describe this, the process present in 
this kind of narrative organization is the repetition of the same 
theme, over and over again. With this client, independently 
of what we ask, we will hear stories of pain, shame, low self-
esteem, loneliness and rejection and so on. In other words, we 
2  This example is inspired in a psychotherapy conducted by the first author 
with a woman in her mid-thirties. 
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will hear variations under the same general theme or narrative 
pattern. This is akin to level 1 change. It is variability without 
any meaningful psychological change. From this variability is 
very difficult to construct a new self-narrative. In fact, clients 
and therapists hardly perceived this variability as “change.”
Sometimes in good outcome therapy, instead of this variability 
something different emerges. Let us say that the therapist invites 
the client to write an “unsent letter” to her parents telling what 
she feels about them. When reading the letter in the session a 
new idea and a strong feeling emerges: she was unable to figure 
out why her parents’ behavior was so rejecting. After all she 
is a mother herself and she feels oppressed by her inability to 
understand the rejection that she was a victim of. Until now she 
was unaware of this urge to understand, because she felt that 
she was the guilty one. Somehow she was not good enough to be 
loved. This was a very important innovation in the therapeutic 
process (a level 2 change in Fogel et al. (2006) model).
Taking level 2 changes as a starting point, therapist and 
client can work towards the construction of level 3 changes. A 
sign of this level of change is, for instance, the fact that the 
client started seeing her relation with her family in a different 
light. Instead of continuing fighting for her family’s attention, 
being nice and a “good girl”, she decided that she needed to let 
the past stay in the past and mourn for the lost family. She now 
faces a very difficult feeling: in fact she never had a family in the 
true sense of the word; she never had someone who really cared. 
As an adult, she also wouldn’t have the love of the family as she 
wished, but she started feeling the need to move forward with 
her life, and, perhaps more important, her present difficulties 
(e.g., raising a child alone) were not a sign of her inability in 
living. This feeling was liberating and initiated a cascade of 
other innovations (e.g., in her relationship with her own son, 
in her relationship with the rest of the family, and so on). As 
in the previous example with mother-infant interaction, from 
the expansion of level 2 changes the developmental change 
emerges. Thus, i-moments are all the moments in which level 
2 change emerges. We will discuss below how level 3 change 
can be constructed from these kinds of innovations or how they 
can be minimized or trivialized, maintaining in this way the 
problematic narrative. However, it is our hypothesis that level 
3 change is constructed by the accumulation of level 2 change, 
creating a new gestalt, able to compete with the previous 
problematic narrative (see Gonçalves, Matos, & Santos, 2009).
The narrative background that supports our research 
inspired us to look at i-moments as processes in which level 2 
change emerges and also allowed us to identify an empirical way 
of doing so. Given its complexity, it is harder to identify level 2 
changes in psychotherapy (as was illustrated by the example above) 
than in more elementary interactions, such as those between a 
caregiver and an infant in which there is a restricted behavioral 
repertoire, without the intricacies of discursive interactions. 
Thus, we track i-moments by identifying the problematic 
narrative that shapes the life of the person and define i-moments 
as all those occurrences in which this narrative is implicitly or 
explicitly defied or rejected. While the problematic narrative is 
the “rule”, the i-moment is the “exception to the rule.”
In our research we began by studying a sample of narrative 
therapy and discovered 5 different types of i-moments (Matos 
& Gonçalves, 2004; Matos, Santos, Gonçalves, & Martins, 
2009). From this first research we developed a coding system 
(Gonçalves, Matos, & Santos, 2009; Gonçalves, Ribeiro, Matos, 
Santos, & Mendes, in press) and checked if this system was 
applicable to different types of psychotherapy (e.g., experiential, 
client-centered, cognitive-behavioral). In individual therapy, this 
coding system seems applicable and reliable as we will discuss 
below. To this point the only difficulty we have encountered is 
related to its application to marital and family therapy given the 
multiplicity of authors involved (Batista, 2008). 
The five different types of i-moments that emerge in 
psychotherapy are action, reflection, protest, re-conceptualization 
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and performing change (see Table 1). We will therefore present 
these five types as well as a clinical vignette illustrating each of 
them (Gonçalves et al., 2009; Gonçalves et al., in press).
Action i-moments refer to specific actions or behaviors that 
challenge the dominance of the problematic narrative.
Clinical vignette (Problematic narrative: agoraphobia)
Therapist: Was it difficult for you to take this step (not 
accepting the rules of “fear” and going out)?
Client: Yes, it was a huge step. For the last several months 
I barely went out. Even coming to therapy was a major 
challenge. I felt really powerless going out. I have to 
prepare myself really well to be able to do this.
Reflection i-moments involve the emergence of new 
understandings or thoughts that are not congruent with 
the dominant plot. The cognitive challenge to the problem, 
envisioning new perspectives on the problem and defying 
cultural prescriptions that facilitate the development of the 
problematic narrative are examples of these i-moments. They 
involve cognitive outcomes that create a different landscape of 
consciousness, to paraphrase Bruner (1986), from the usual one 
associated with the problematic narrative.
Clinical vignette (Problematic narrative: depression)
Client: I’m starting to wonder about how my life will be 
like if I keep feeding my depression.
Therapist: It’s becoming clear that depression has a 
hidden agenda for your life?
Client: Yes, sure. 
Therapist: What is it that depression wants from you?
Client: It wants to rule my whole life and in the end it 
wants to steal my life from me.
Protest i-moments are present when there is some sort of protest 
against the problem, against its specifications and also against the 
persons who are somehow the problem’s supporters. It can take 
the form of an action or a reflection, but it necessarily involves 
an active form of resistance, repositioning the self towards the 
problematic narrative and through this, a more proactive process 
emerges (e.g., deciding something relevant about the problem 
that reduces its power over the client’s life). In these i-moments 
we can discern, implicitly or explicitly, two positions: one that 
supports the problematic narrative and another one that defies 
it. In a protest i-moment the latter position gains more power 
than the former.
Clinical vignette (Problematic narrative: feeling rejected and 
judged by her parents)
Client: I talked about it just to demonstrate what I’ve 
been doing until now, fighting for it…
Therapist: Fighting against the idea that you should do 
what your parents thought was good for you?
Client: I was trying to change myself all the time, to 
please them. But now I’m getting tired, I am realizing 
that it doesn’t make any sense to make this effort.
Therapist: That effort keeps you in a position of changing 
yourself all the time, the way you feel and think…
Client: Yes, sure. And I’m really tired of that, I can’t 
stand it anymore. After all, parents are supposed to love 
their children and not judge them all the time.
Re-conceptualization i-moments involve a meta-reflective level, 
meaning that the person not only understands what is different 
in her or him (which would be reflection or protest), but also is 
able to describe the processes involved in that transformation. 
These i-moments involve three components: the self in the 
past (problematic narrative), the self in the present and the 
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description of the processes that allowed the transformation 
from the past to the present. The client not only understands 
something new but he or she can also establish a distinction 
from a previous condition and has access to the processes by 
which the transformation took place.
Clinical vignette (Problematic narrative: partner’s abuse and 
its effects)
Client: I think I started enjoying myself again. I had 
a time… I think I’ve stopped in time. I’ve always 
been a person that liked myself. There was a time… 
maybe because of my attitude, because of all that was 
happening, I think there was a time that I was not 
respecting myself… despite the effort to show that I 
wasn’t feeling… so well with myself… I couldn’t feel 
that joy of living, that I recovered now… and now I keep 
thinking “you have to move on and get your life back.” 
Therapist: This position of “you have to move on” has 
been decisive? 
Client: That was important. I felt so weak at the 
beginning! I hated feeling like that…. Today I think 
“I’m not weak.” In fact, maybe I am very strong, because 
of all that happened to me, I can still see the good side 
of people and I don’t think I’m being naïve… Now, 
when I look at myself, I think “no, you can really make a 
difference, and you have value as a person.” For a while 
I couldn’t have this dialogue with myself, I couldn’t say 
“you can do it” nor even think “I am good at this or 
that”… 
Performing Change. The term i-moments refers to the 
anticipation or planning of new experiences, projects or 
activities. In these i-moments the client may apply newly learned 
skills to daily life, performing new ways of acting, getting back 
to former and abandoned projects and activities, or think about 
what she/he has learned with the problematic story that could 
make the next change in her/his life meaningful. 
Clinical vignette (Problematic narrative: partner’s abuse and 
its effects)
Therapist: You seem to have so many projects for the 
future now!
Client: Yes, you’re right. I want to do all the things that 
were impossible for me to do while I was dominated by 
fear. I want to work again and to have the time to enjoy 
my life with my children. I want to have friends again. 
The loss of all the friendships of the past is something 
that still hurts me really deeply. I want to have friends 
again, to have people to talk to, to share experiences 
and to feel the complicity of others in my life again.
Bruner (1986) suggested that narratives are constructed in 
two landscapes, one of action and another one of consciousness. 
Landscape of action refers to the development of the plot, the 
actions taking place, the actors involved and the setting where 
action occurred. Landscape of consciousness refers to what 
actors know, feel and think, or what are their projects, values 
or intentions. Although one landscape can transform the other, 
“they are essential and distinct: it is the difference between 
Oedipus sharing Jocasta’s bed before and after he learns from 
the messenger that she is his mother.” (p. 14).
Action and reflection i-moments are “pure” representatives 
of action and consciousness landscapes. As we said before, 
protest can occur in one landscape or in the other, or can even 
have elements from both. Likewise, performing change can 
be situated in both landscapes, being a new way of feeling or 
thinking, or a new action. Re-conceptualization as a meta-level 
typically has elements of both landscapes, integrating them. 
38
StudieS in Meaning 4 Part ii
39
narrative conStruction of change gonçalveS et al
The coding system we constructed (Gonçalves et al., 2009; 
Gonçalves et al., in press) from this variety of i-moments allows 
the study of a diversity of psychotherapy cases, from small 
samples to single-cases. The results of our findings and the 
heuristic model of change that we have constructed from our 
data will be described below. Before we proceed, we need to 
clarify some methodological details. Readers who wish to learn 
more about this coding system may order it directly from the 
authors (free of charge).
Methodological Procedures 
In order to systematize the procedures of i-moment coding 
we developed the Innovative Moments Coding System (IMCS, 
Gonçalves et al., 2009; Gonçalves et al., in press ). The IMCS is 
a qualitative method of data analysis applicable to studies where 
the aim is to understand change processes beneath different life 
situations; for instance, therapeutic and non-therapeutic change, 
specific life transitions and adaptations to new health situations. 
In this sense, it is applied to qualitative data, namely discourse 
or conversation, such as therapeutic sessions, qualitative in-
depth interviews or biographies, predominantly through video/
audio systems or transcript support. We will further describe 
the procedures that are applied in such analyses.
After establishing the IMCS, we developed a training 
program for reliable coding of i-moments. Within this training, 
coders are first familiarized with the data collection and 
participants, but are not aware of the hypothesis being studied 
or the group (good or poor outcome) to which a particular 
case belongs. After this training, coders can engage in coding 
research material.
The codification procedure requires analysis by two coders. 
The first contact with materials (e.g., sessions, interviews 
transcripts) is reading/visualizing/listening to the data (e.g., 
one entire therapeutic case) to get familiar with the material 
under analysis. After this initial procedure, coders must gather 
and discuss their views on participants’ problematic narrative, 
and the different facets of it (e.g., intrapersonal, interpersonal 
problems, work, family). After this discussion, the problems 
should be identified consensually and their definition must be 
as close as possible to the client’s/ interviewee’s narrative. This 
procedure sets the stage for i-moment identification, as they 
involve every moment when the participant engages in novel 
or different actions, thoughts or emotions, from the identified 
problem(s). For instance, the act of “walking away from the 
problematic situation” can be coded as an action i-moment if the 
problem is intimate abuse, even though an equivalent act can 
be part of the problem if it is viewed as avoidance behavior 
involved in an anxiety disorder. The next step of analysis is to 
assign all the material to one of the judges (Judge A), and at 
least 30% of it to the other (Judge B). This percentage of the 
material should include initial, middle and final data sessions 
of each participant. Then, the material is coded independently, 
which allows for reliability checks (percentage of agreement and 
Cohen’s Kappa). 
The coding procedure is conducted by reviewing the 
material in a sequential fashion (session one, two, three and 
so forth). Each session is analyzed and coders have to identify 
each i-moment excerpt, categorize it and record its duration 
(the beginning and the end of each i-moment, to the nearest 
second).
In sum, i-moments coding involves the analysis of three 
main indexes:
The type of i-moment:•	  Action, Reflection, Protest, 
Re-conceptualization and Performing change. 
The salience of i-moments,•	  representing the percentage 
of time occupied by each i-moment in the session. 
It is computed from the duration of telling the 
specific i-moment, related to the total duration time 
of the session. Alternatively, to code transcripts, the 
temporal salience could be measured by the quantity 
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of text occupied by each i-moment, in reference to the 
full text (measured in the number of words).  In each 
session an index of temporal salience is computed 
for each of the five I-moments, as the percentage of 
time in which a specific i-moment was narrated in 
the session. We also computed an index of overall 
temporal salience of i-moments as the sum of the 
saliencies’ of the five i-moments for each session. 
The index of each case temporal salience is obtained 
through a mean score of temporal saliencies of all 
sessions.
Emergence of i-moments•	 , indicating if an i-moment 
is brought to the conversation by the therapist/
interviewer or the client/interviewed. Basically, 
there are three possibilities: (1) the i-moment is 
produced by the therapist (e.g., through a question 
or commentary), but is accepted and elaborated by 
the client; (2) the i-moment results from a therapist’s 
question which does not refer clearly the i-moment, 
facilitating its emergence (e.g., T: What can you learn 
from this experience?; C: I learned that…[a specific 
i-moment]); or (3) the i-moment is spontaneously 
produced by the client, not being triggered by any 
specific question made by the therapist. This topic 
should be addressed after the codification of the 
i-moments. 
Thus, the coding process involves four steps: (1) identifying 
one i-moment, (2) deciding what type it is, (3) marking the 
beginning and the end of it, and (4) identifying if it was asked 
directly or indirectly by the therapist, or if it was spontaneously 
produced by the client.
For reliability purposes the coding requires, as we mentioned 
before, two trained coders. Interjudge percentage of agreement 
on overall temporal salience is calculated as the temporal 
salience of i-moments identified by both judges (agreement) 
divided by the time identified by either judge (or, equivalently, 
twice the time spent on agreed i-moments divided by the sum of 
i-moments times independently identified by the two judges). 
After identifying the passages (through temporal salience 
agreement) where both coders agreed that it corresponded to an 
i-moment, the reliability for distinguishing i-moment categories 
is calculated by Cohen’s kappa. If kappa >.75 (strong agreement) 
the analyses are based on judge’s A ratings. 
Major Findings
Given the fact that the coding of all sessions of a case, 
second by second, is so arduous we have been working with 
relatively small samples (e.g., N = 10 comparing good and poor 
outcome cases) or intensively analyzing case studies. To this 
point we have results from one sample of narrative therapy 
with victims of partner’s abuse (Matos et al., 2009) and another 
one of major depression treated with emotion-focused therapy 
(Mendes, Gonçalves, Angus, & Greenberg, 2008) from the York 
I Depression Study (Greenberg & Watson, 1998)3.  Besides these 
two main samples we have been conducting several intensive 
case-studies, which allow us to investigate change processes at 
a more microanalytic level. Summarizing the most important 
data from these two samples, several findings are particularly 
interesting and will be targeted in the models presented below.
Good outcome cases are clearly different from poor outcome 
cases, as can be seen in Figures 1, 2 and 3. All these figures show 
the average of i-moments in each case, the first two from the 
sample of narrative therapy and the third one from the emotion-
focused therapy sample. These findings are also congruent with 
the case-studies we have done to this point.
3  We are grateful to Lynne Angus and Leslie Greenberg for allowing us to 
work with their sample from EFT.
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Figure 1.  Good outcome cases in narrative therapy
Figure 2.  Poor outcome cases in narrative therapy
Figure 3.  Good and poor outcome cases in EFT
An initial examination of these fi gures shows that the 
temporal salience of i-moments is signifi cantly higher in 
good outcome cases, but curiously i-moments occurred also 
in poor outcome cases. This means that level 2 changes occur 
in psychotherapy even when the outcome is poor. We will 
discuss below what processes may be involved in preventing the 
development of a level 3 change.
A closer look makes it clear that in narrative therapy re-
conceptualization and performing change are almost absent 
in the poor outcome sample. Something similar, although not 
so clear in the case of performing change, also occurs in the 
emotion-focused sample. Clearly, re-conceptualization is very 
infrequent in or absent from the poor outcome sample in both 
therapeutic models. 
In order to have a more process-oriented view of the 
development of i-moments throughout therapy, Figures 4 and 5 
show the evolution session by session of one good and one poor 
outcome case from the fi rst sample.
There is a tendency of i-moments to increase throughout the 
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psychotherapy process in good outcome cases, appearing as a 
high diversity of types of i-moments almost from the beginning. 
For instance in session 2 there is already action, refl ection and 
protest i-moments; and after session 4 all i-moments are present, 
continuing to occur until the end of therapy (Santos, Gonçalves, 
Matos, & Salvatore, 2008).
In poor outcome cases the diversity of i-moments is usually 
much reduced. Along the therapy one can see action and protest, 
or protest and refl ection; but there are hardly any sessions 
in which the fi ve types occur. Thus, most of the times two or 
three types of i-moments appear in poor outcome cases (with a 
clear prominence for action, refl ection and protest). Also, as we 
said before re-conceptualization and performing change have 
a reduced presence, if they are not absent entirely (Matos et 
al., 2009). Re-conceptualization i-moments usually emerge in 
the middle of the psychotherapy process and increase until the 
end. The majority of new experience i-moments occur after the 
development of re-conceptualization.
Figure 4.  A good outcome case in narrative therapy (11 sessions plus 
follow-up)
Figure 5.  A poor outcome case in narrative therapy (15 sessions plus 
follow-up)
So, let us briefl y summarize what we have found in the two 
samples presented here, which are also congruent with several 
intensive case studies (e.g., Gonçalves, Mendes, Ribeiro, Angus, 
& Greenberg, 2008; Ribeiro, Gonçalves, & Fernandes, 2008).
The global picture of good-outcome cases is characterized 
by a progressive tendency toward the generation of i-moments 
from the beginning to the end of therapy; action, refl ection and 
protest being more salient at the beginning than at the end. 
Re-conceptualization emerges in the middle phase of therapy 
and increases until the end, seeming to be an important marker 
of successful psychotherapy. Performing change tend to appear 
after re-conceptualization, representing a performance of the 
change process.
The global picture of poor-outcome cases is characterized 
by a lower temporal salience of i-moments, taking the form of 
action, protest and refl ection without a clear increasing tendency. 
Re-conceptualization and performing change are absent or have 
a very low temporal salience.
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An interesting communality between good and poor 
outcome cases, despite all the differences found, is the presence 
of i-moments from session 1 onward. This reinforces the idea 
that level 2 changes take place even when people are dominated 
by problematic narratives, and that potential openings to new 
narratives are present, even if they are later on dismissed, ignored 
or trivialized. 
Curiously we have also results from a project that studied 
“spontaneous” change that reproduces these results. In an 
exploratory study (Cruz & Gonçalves, 2008) we asked the 
participants (N = 27) to identify three types of difficulties in 
their lives: past (and solved), present (at the moment of the 
interview) and persistent (present for more than 6 months). 
The interviews were coded for the presence of i-moments with 
the IMCS (Gonçalves et al., 2009; Gonçalves, et al., in press) 
and significant differences were found between solved and non-
solved difficulties in re-conceptualization i-moments. This kind 
of i-moment was the only one that significantly differentiated 
solved from present difficulties. A similar study, but with 
a longitudinal design, replicated these findings concerning 
re-conceptualization (Meira, Gonçalves, Salgado, & Cunha, 
2008). 
The results presented here suggest that re-conceptualization 
seems to be a critical ingredient in the process of sustaining 
change. In the next section we will discuss not only a model of 
change based on these results, but also a model that explains the 
persistence of problematic narratives.
A Heuristic Model of Therapeutic Change
From the results briefly presented we have suggested a 
general model of narrative change (Gonçalves et al., 2008; 
Gonçalves et al., 2009; Matos et al., 2009), in which i-moments 
have a pivotal role. 
Of course we know that there are several ways to abort this 
emergence of novelty. The person can implicitly or explicitly 
refuse the meaningful nature of these events, as it happens 
frequently in clinical practice. The novelty can be turned into 
something similar to the old narrative. Cognitive therapists have 
described this process as a cognitive distortion (e.g., Beck, Rush, 
Shaw, & Emery, 1979) and constructivist theorists (e.g., Mahoney, 
1991) have referred to this process as a form of protecting and 
maintaining the core-ordering processes within the person. 
We argue that this process is fed by several forms of narrative 
invalidation, in which the power of the problematic narrative 
is so strong that even what appears as novelties and exceptions 
to the rule are transformed accordingly to the problematic 
narrative. We will return to these forms of invalidation later in 
this chapter. Sometimes, even if the person is validating to him 
or herself the change that is taking place, significant others can 
have a powerful impact in deflecting the novelties, making them 
non-meaningful (e.g., “you’re better because of your medication”), 
false (e.g., “in reality you’re doing/thinking X (a novelty), but what 
you mean is Y (problematic narrative)”), or trivial (e.g., “you’re 
doing/thinking differently, but later you’ll do/think as usual”). 
Our life-narratives, as White (2007) recently emphasized, and as 
a long tradition of systemic thinking reinforces (e.g., Minuchin, 
1974/1999; Watzlawick, Bavelas, & Jackson, 1967), have to be 
validated by significant others. Sometimes the others in our 
lives don’t really believe that we can change and this can be a 
very strong obstacle to attain that goal, becoming in this way a 
self-fulfilling prophecy (Watzlawick, Bavelas, & Jackson, 1967). 
Thus, our claim is that these novelties, to be sustained, need to 
be intrapersonally and interpersonally validated, meaning that 
self and significant others need to conceptualize somehow these 
novelties as personal changes, and not as the same story.
From our view action and reflection i-moments are the more 
elementary forms of innovation. As people start to act differently 
and think differently about the problematic narrative these 
i-moments can be signs to the self and others that something 
different from the “old story” is taking place. Cycles of action 
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and reflection (or the other way around from reflection to action) 
may be needed to assure the person and to others that something 
really different from the problematic narrative is occurring. 
Curiously, in the cases studied so far, most of the times 
reflection has a stronger temporal salience than action. We do 
not know at this stage if the opposite scenario (action higher 
than reflection) is common. In any case, it seems that even if the 
beginning of the change process occurs with action i-moments, 
the reflection of the client about them, spontaneously produced 
or triggered by therapist questions, allows the elaboration of these 
action i-moments in the landscape of consciousness (triggering 
more reflection i-moments). The future study of cases with a 
theoretical orientation that favors action rather than meaning 
(e.g., early stages of cognitive-behavioral therapies) could be an 
interesting way to empirically address this issue.
In some cases several cycles of action-reflection i-moments 
occur before protest i-moments surface, whereas at other times 
protest appears from the beginning of therapy (see Gonçalves 
et al., 2008). We consider that protest i-moments are very 
important since they represent a strong attitudinal movement 
against the problematic narrative. They can occur as forms of 
action or as reflection, but they are more proactive, given the 
meaning implied in them, as the person strongly refuses the 
problematic narrative.
We have identified two different types of protest i-moments 
with two apparently different functions in the change process. 
Protest can address the problematic narrative and the people 
who support them (e.g., “my husband is responsible for his 
actions, he should not blame me all the time”) or protest can be 
directed to changes in the self (e.g., “I want to be loved, I need 
that”). It is our hypothesis that the first form of protest may be 
needed at the beginning, but if the person is not able to center 
in the self later on, protest becomes a mere opposition to the 
problematic narrative. The transition to protest centered on the 
self is a way to assert the needs that the person is feeling, and 
from here a new position can emerge, different from the mere 
opposition towards the problem. We found that this second kind 
of protest (centered on the self) is sometimes deeply associated 
with the emergence of re-conceptualization (Gonçalves et al., 
2008; Santos et al., in press).
In fact, we suspect that a new narrative of the self may be 
not sustained only by these three kinds of i-moments (action, 
reflection and protest) and perhaps one of the reasons is that 
they can be a mere opposition to the problem, which means that 
they can operate inside the same constructs that are responsible 
for the problematic narrative (more about this latter). That 
way the problem is present even in its absence, given that the 
client operates inside a dichotomy between the problem and its 
negation (e.g., “I’m depressed … I want to be happy”). Perhaps 
this is an important reason that makes re-conceptualization 
vital in the process of change: its ability to integrate old and 
new, the former problematic narrative and the emergent one. 
In fact, when coding re-conceptualization one needs to have 
some description of the process of change, and also the contrast 
between past and present self. Thus, re-conceptualization must 
be more than some form of negation of the problem, as it has 
to have new dimensions outside the dichotomy of “problem / 
negation of the problem.” We will return to this topic later when 
discussing the stability of the problematic narrative.
Another important reason for the inability of action, 
reflection and protest to produce stable narrative change is that 
they are most of the times episodic and unstructured, and hence, 
unable to create a structure that can organize the diversity of 
innovations. Re-conceptualization, emerging in the middle stage 
of successful psychotherapy, is in our view responsible precisely 
for this organization. Given its narrative structure it can give 
coherence to what otherwise would be disperse occurrences of 
novelties. That way, re-conceptualization acts like a gravitational 
narrative field, attracting and giving purpose and meaning to 
other i-moments.
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Finally, with re-conceptualization i-moments the client 
posits herself or himself as the author of the change process. 
The client is not only an actor, but given his/her access to 
the way the plot is changing he or she is authoring it (to use a 
distinction from Sarbin, 1986).
After some elaboration of re-conceptualization i-moments, 
new cycles of novelty exploration occur again in the form of 
action, reflection and protest; this time, consolidating and being 
consolidated by re-conceptualization i-moments. Several cycles 
may be needed to sustain change. Finally, performing change 
i-moments expand the change process into the future since, as 
several authors suggested (Crites, 1986; Omer & Alon, 1997; 
Slusky, 1998), good new stories have to have a future. 
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Figure 6.  Model of i-moment change in psychotherapy
We have previously suggested (Gonçalves et al., 2008; 
Gonçalves et al., 2009; Santos et al., in press) that several other 
models of change can help us make sense of the role that re-
conceptualization plays in the change process. For instance, re-
conceptualization has some overlap with the concept of insight 
(Castonguay & Hill, 2007), which has a central role in change 
according to a diversity of therapeutic models. However, we 
argue that insight is related not only to re-conceptualization, but 
also to reflection and protest as these are defined in our model. 
Thus, it is interesting that reflection and protest as possible 
forms of insight do not discriminate good from poor outcome 
cases, while re-conceptualization does so.
The model of assimilation of voices proposed by Stiles can 
also highlight the role of re-conceptualization in therapeutic 
change. For Stiles and colleagues (Honos-Webb & Stiles, 1998; 
Stiles, 1999; Stiles et al., 1990; Stiles, Meshot, Anderson, & 
Sloan, 1992) the self can be conceptualized as a community of 
voices that represent former experiences of the person. Each 
experience leaves an active trait in the form of a voice. Most 
of the times these voices are resources for dealing with new 
experiences, but other times painful experiences make some 
voices difficult to accept by the community (that is, the self). Stiles 
and his team have been studying the assimilation of problematic 
experiences with this model and have developed a coding process 
to identify the status of the problematic voices in reference to 
the other voices of the self – the assimilation of problematic 
experiences scale (APES). The APES (see Honos-Webb & Stiles, 
1998; Osatuke & Stiles, 2006) identifies voices from the level 
0 (warded off dissociated), in which the person is unaware of 
the problem and the problematic voice is dissociated; to level 7 
(integration – mastery), in which the client generalizes solutions 
to new problems and the previous poorly integrated experience 
so that the voice is now part of the community of voices. The 
intermediate level (4) seems very important and marks the level 
that is not attained in poor outcome cases (Detert et al., 2006). 
This level is precisely the one in which understanding and insight 
is possible. Although we have no empirical data confirming this, 
we can speculate that re-conceptualization operates at level 4 or 
higher in the APES scale. Empirical studies that use both the 
APES and the IMCS with the same cases can clarify this issue 
in the future.
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development of re-conceptualization in poor outcome cases? Or 
in other words, what prevents level 3 change after some level 2 
changes have occurred? We will address this topic in the next 
section.
A Heuristic Model for Therapeutic Stability
We suggest that one important way of impeding re-
conceptualization is the process of mutual in-feeding (Valsiner, 
2002). Valsiner described this as an ambivalent process in which 
two opposite voices (e.g., “life is good”, “life is bad”) feed each 
other, thus stabilizing the dialogical self from further change. 
Take the following hypothetical example, in which voice A is 
“I’m sad” and voice B is “I want to be happy.” According to 
IMCS voice A could be the problematic voice and voice B would 
be an i-moment (in this case a reflective one). Imagine that we 
have the sequence of voices depicted in Figure 7.
In this example, we have two opposite voices that feed each 
other virtually ad eternum.  Actually, this is an extreme example 
of mutual in-feeding, because the two voices, as time goes by, 
are becoming more polarized, a process that Valsiner (2002) 
terms escalating of voices. The most interesting thing in this 
example is that what maintains stability is a dynamic process in 
the relationship between the initial voices.
 
 
Figure 7.  Dynamic stability between two opposite voices through 
mutual in-feeding
From a different perspective, the therapeutic cycles 
mode from Mergenthaler (see Lepper & Mergenthaler, 2007; 
Mergenthaler, 1996) proposes that change takes place in cycles 
of reflection (abstraction) and emotional processing (emotional 
tone). According to this model of change, the following pattern 
of four stages can be identified: relaxing (low abstraction and 
low emotional tone), experiencing (high emotional tone and low 
abstraction), connecting (high abstraction, high emotional tone), 
reflecting (high abstraction, low emotional tone). Each four stage 
cycle gives place to another cycle, starting again with relaxing, 
and so on. In the i-moments system, we do not explicitly track 
emotional experience, although it is likely that what we call 
re-conceptualization may fall under connecting and reflecting 
modes. So what we suggested about the cross-fertilization 
between the IMCS and the APES may be applicable to the study 
of the IMCS with the therapeutic cycles model.
Finally, the narrative research from Angus and her team 
(Angus, Lewin, Bouffard, & Rotondi-Trevisan, 2004) also has 
some important connections with our program. Angus and 
colleagues have identified three different narrative modes: 
external, internal and reflexive. This model conceptualizes 
change “as entailing a process of dialectical shifts between 
narrative story-telling (external narrative mode), emotional 
differentiation (internal narrative mode), and reflexive meaning-
making modes of inquiry” (Angus et al., 2004, p. 88). However, 
the narrative process model is very different from our IMCS, 
as the latter is a system of tracking novelties in the process of 
change. So, while the model proposed by Angus and colleagues 
addresses the way narratives are elaborated and assimilated in 
psychotherapy by integrating external, internal and reflective 
dimensions, the IMCS focuses on the way novelties emerge and 
are elaborated in psychotherapy.
From our perspective, and assuming as a solid result that 
re-conceptualization clearly discriminates good from poor 
outcome cases, an interesting question arises: what blocks the 
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From the perspective of IMCS the problematic narrative 
and the emergence of action, reflection and protest i-moments 
can be related in a way that they feed into each other, resulting 
in a stable feedback loop, similar to the one depicted in Figure 
7. We suggested that this can only happen in these i-moments 
and not in re-conceptualization i-moments, because in this last 
one the contradiction between the problem and innovation is 
already dialectically integrated inside the i-moment (past and 
present self). The other i-moments can be a mere opposition of 
the problem, facilitating in this way the return to it.
Performing change, by their nature (generalization of the 
change process into several life domains) can hardly be involved 
in mutual in-feeding process. Also, they tend to occur later in 
the process of change and in principle mutual in-feeding in good 
outcome cases should occur more at early stages of therapy.
When mutual in-feeding occurs in action, reflection and 
protest i-moments they temporally free the person from the 
problem, but facilitate the return to it, given that the negation 
of the problem makes it present even when it is absent. If I want 
to be happy, and this is the contrary of feeling depressed, then if 
I can’t be happy as I dreamt, this means that I’m really miserable! 
Clinically this process is also clear in the counter phobic 
reactions of fearful clients: dreaming about freeing themselves 
from fear makes them be “courageous” to a point that they get 
paralyzed by fear again. Thus, novelties are created but soon are 
bypassed given the return to the problematic narrative.
The process of mutual in-feeding can be conceptualized from 
other theoretical perspectives. For instance, from a personal 
construct perspective the same process can be described as the 
dance between two poles of the same construct, which Kelly (1955) 
called “slot rattling.” In strategic therapy this is akin to what 
was termed an “ironic process” (Shoham & Rohrbaugh, 2002), 
in which the more the person tries to get free from the problem 
the more the problem stays strong (Watzlawick, Weakland, & 
Fish, 1974). Or in Stiles’ model of assimilation (Brinegar, Salvi, 
Stiles, & Greenberg, 2006) these exchanges between voices 
can be theorized as a process of “rapid crossfire,” in which the 
person oscillates between two contradictory voices. Gustaffson 
(1992; see also Omer, 1994) refers to a similar process: “these 
[dominant] stories seem inescapable because what is viewed as 
the only alternative (the shadow story) turns out to be a loop that 
reintroduces the main line” (Omer, 1994, p. 47).
Whatever the theoretical perspective from which one 
conceptualizes this phenomenon, from a dialogical framework 
this is a dynamic process responsible for a monological, closed 
outcome (see Gonçalves & Guilfoyle, 2006). Figure 8 illustrates 
this process of mutual in-feeding. Thus, it is our hypothesis that 
re-conceptualization leads to the overcoming of the mutual in-
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Figure 8.  Mutual in-feeding in psychotherapy
We addressed this topic empirically by studying discursive 
markers of return to the problem, after the emergence of an 
i-moment. The results that we present below were obtained 
in the sample previously described of narrative therapy with 
women victims of partner abuse. However we currently have 
56
StudieS in Meaning 4 Part ii
57
narrative conStruction of change gonçalveS et al
only preliminary results from 6 cases: 3 good outcome and 3 poor 
outcome cases. The way we operationally defined the theoretical 
concept of mutual in-feeding was by identifying all the times an 
i-moment emerged and was immediately followed by a return to 
the problem. Let us illustrate this with two examples from our 
sample (poor outcome cases):
First Session
Therapist: You said that “in part” you have a voice that 
says you don’t have to make any effort because you 
would never get anywhere. But is there another voice? 
Client: Yes, there’s other part that seems that I can do 
everything! (Reflection i-moment) But suddenly, it falls 
down! Like a house of cards that we build and then 
suddenly falls! (return to the problematic narrative)
Fourth Session
Therapist: What do you want to do to this “wave” 
(externalized label for depressive symptoms)? Today 
you’ve defied it … 
Client: End with it completely, (Protest i-moment) but it 
seems very difficult to me… (Return to the problematic 
narrative)
Therapist: End with it…! You´re ambitious! 
In these examples the client describes the i-moment but 
immediately returns to the problematic narrative. Thus, these 
markers appear immediately after the i-moment or during its 
description. It is clear that the use of linguistic connectors (e.g., 
but, however, but still, it’s just that) represents opposition or 
denial of what has just been asserted. 
In terms of procedures the coding of the return to the 
problem markers was made by two independent judges, unaware 
of the status of the case (poor or good outcome). For each session 
the judges coded the presence or absence of the return to the 
problem for each i-moment previously identified in the former 
research (Cohen’s Kappa was .85).  Over 20% of i-moments in 
poor outcome cases had markers of returning to the problem, 
whereas these markers occurred in only about 2% of good 
outcome cases. 
If we now take a closer look at what type of i-moments 
had returned to the problem markers, it is clear that this only 
occurred in action, reflection and protest – as we have predicted. 
Another question is, of course, what is the possible causality 
between return to the problem markers and re-conceptualization 
i-moments. If the data obtained with this sample is replicated, 
it seems that the return to the problem (or mutual in-feeding) 
impedes the emergence of re-conceptualization, given the 
low occurrence of this dance between the problem and the 
innovations in good outcome cases4. However, if we take into 
account intensive case-studies perhaps one could hypothesize 
that re-conceptualization may also prevent the return to the 
problem. Figure 9 below shows an evolution along 12 sessions 
of a constructivist therapy process. In the figure we have 
represented the evolution of i-moments with and without return 
to the problem markers. In this case, curiously, the amount 
of presence and absence of these markers is almost the same 
until session 5, after which the tendency is clearly different: 
the presence of the problem marker clearly diminishes, while 
i-moments without the markers clearly increase. Interestingly, 
it was precisely at session 6 that re-conceptualization emerges, 
which suggests some relationship in this case between these two 
processes. 
4  Of course, we don’t know at this moment if other processes prevent both 
the resolution of mutual in-feeding and the emergence of re-conceptualiza-
tion.
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Figure 9. Return to problem markers in one case of good constructivist 
therapy
Of course, it is not possible at this time to infer any causal 
relationships between mutual in-feeding and re-conceptualization, 
but from these data it is clear that the return to the problem plays 
an important role in poor-outcome psychotherapy. Also, the 
absence of these indicators in re-conceptualization reinforces 
the idea that these i-moments may be pivotal in the process of 
change.
Some Implications for Practice
In our view it is too early to infer from our research program 
clear implications for psychotherapeutic practice. We need to 
study these processes in other samples and expand the research 
with more intensive cases studies. However, the results found 
until now suggest that i-moments can be a relevant strategy to 
track and analyze the therapeutic change.
Also, it is clear through the heterogeneous nature of i-moments 
that some can be more “potent” than others in the promotion 
of level 3 change. Therapists can dedicate some effort in the 
middle of therapeutic process to the elaboration and expansion 
of i-moments, mainly in the form of re-conceptualization. Of 
course, the other types, according to our model, may be needed 
to achieve re-conceptualization.
It also may be important in therapy to elaborate novelties 
outside the dichotomy problem–opposition to the problem. In 
this context the attention of therapists can be focused in the 
processes of mutual in-feeding and conversational strategies 
to bypass it. Of course, we need to contrast poor and good 
outcome cases in what concerns mutual in-feeding to learn what 
conversational strategies prevent or facilitate getting out of 
this process. In this sense, we are starting to explore if there 
is a link between specific therapist response modes and client 
response modes preceding or associated with the appearance 
of i-moments in different kinds of therapeutic modalities. This 
might indicate some “preferred” client-therapist conversational 
interactions that are more associated with the amplification of 
i-moments into a new self-narrative.
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